The Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Disputes: A Neo-Institutional Perspective
Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, and William J. Dixon

American Journal of Political Science 33 (4): 825-841 (1989)

Abstract
This study conceptualizes the U.S. Supreme Court as a political institution whose decision-making behavior over time can be effectively explained and predicted. A four-variable model is constructed as a means of better understanding the Court's policy outputs in criminal justice disputes. This model represents Court decisions as a function of the institution's political composition, the generally stable attitudes of its members, its policymaking priorities, and the political environment. The results indicate that the model has substantial explanatory and predictive capacity when applied to Supreme Court criminal rights cases from 1946 to 1986.

keywords: Supreme Court, criminal justice, judicial decision-making, political composition, judicial attitudes, policymaking, criminal rights, political environment, institutional analysis